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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of fiscal policy, measured by changes in government 
spending and net tax (government tax revenue less transfer payments), on New Zealand 
GDP.  The framework of analysis is a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model of the 
New  Zealand economy, employing and extending estimation techniques used by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  This model is then used to examine the dynamic effects of 
changes in government spending, taxes and transfers on GDP and the contributions of 
discretionary fiscal policy to New Zealand business cycles.   
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  C32 - Time-series models 
E32 - Business fluctuations; cycles  
E62 - Fiscal policy; public expenditures, investment, and finance; 
taxation 
KEYWORDS  Fiscal policy, business cycle fluctuations, vector autoregression 
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An empirical investigation of fiscal 
policy in New Zealand 
1 Introduction 
This paper examines the effects of fiscal policy, as measured by government spending 
and net tax, on New Zealand GDP.  The focus is on the temporary, business cycle effects 
of fiscal policy on GDP.
1
  The work provides a basis for evaluating the impact of fiscal 
policy on New Zealand GDP, thereby complementing existing fiscal indicators, such as 
the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance and other measures of fiscal impulse.  This paper 
also furthers previous work examining the sources of fluctuations in New Zealand GDP 
(Buckle, Kim, Kirkham, McLellan and Sharma, 2002; Buckle, Kim and McLellan, 2003) by 
analysing the contribution of fiscal policy to New Zealand business cycles.   
Different approaches have been used to measure the effects of fiscal policy on key 
economic aggregates, like GDP, inflation and interest and exchange rates.  One approach 
is to simulate fiscal policy changes using large-scale structural macroeconomic model.  An 
alternative approach is to estimate smaller empirical models, such as vector 
autoregression (VAR) models to assess the effects of changes in fiscal policy on the 
economy.  A variety of techniques have been used to identify the effects of fiscal policy 
using these smaller empirical models.  For example, Blinder (1981) and Ramey and 
Shapiro (1998) examine the effects of fiscal policy on the United States economy by 
identifying particular fiscal episodes or events, such as the temporary income tax 
reductions in 1968 and 1975 or increases in defence spending associated with the military 
build-up during the Korean and Vietnam wars.  Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti 
(2004), who examine fiscal policy in the United States and a selection of OECD 
economies, use a structural  VAR model to measure the dynamic impact of fiscal shocks 
to output.  Their innovation is to use institutional information on the tax and transfer 
system to identify the effects of fiscal policy shocks on output.  
This paper builds on Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  It replicates Blanchard and Perotti’s 
three-variable vector autoregression (VAR) model, which was originally estimated using 
United States data, for New Zealand.  The model, which includes gross domestic product 
(GDP), net tax (i.e. tax revenue less transfer payments) and government spending, is then 
used to examine the effects of changes in net tax and government spending and their 
historical contributions of fiscal policy to New Zealand business cycles.  Blanchard and 
Perotti’s model is also extended by examining the separate impact of taxes and 
government transfers.   
                                                                  
1   Fiscal policy also has important long-run economic effects.  For a discussion of the long-run economic effects of fiscal policy see 
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999).     
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model and 
data.  Section 3 discusses the instantaneous (contemporaneous) dynamic effects of 
shocks in both net tax and government spending.  Section 4 reports sensitivity analysis, 
robustness testing, and compares the New Zealand results to that from other models and 
economies.  The historical contributions of net tax to New Zealand business cycles are 
examined in section 5.  Key conclusions are discussed in section 6. 
2  Model and data 
This section outlines the modelling framework used to assess the impact of fiscal policy 
on New Zealand output.  The framework of analysis is a structural vector autoregression 
(VAR) model, employing estimation and identification techniques used by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002).  This section derives the fiscal VAR model and the restrictions used to 
identify the effects of net tax and government spending on gross domestic product (GDP).  
It describes the fiscal and economic data and discusses their time series properties and 
trend specification. 
2.1  Fiscal VAR and identification 
The fiscal VAR model is described by a system of reduced-form equations.  Ignoring 
constant terms, it is given by  
()tt ALy ε =    (1) 
where  () AL  is a 
th p  order matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, such that 
2
12 ( ) ...
p
tp AL I AL AL AL =− − −− .  Throughout,  p  is set equal to four as quarterly data 
are used in the analysis.
2
  In this model,  [] ′ ≡ t t t t Z G T y , ,  is a three-dimensional vector in 
the logarithms of quarterly net tax (government tax revenue less transfer payments), 
government spending and GDP, although our extension of this model also disaggregates 
net tax into taxes and government transfers.  Each variable is expressed in real per capita 








t t ε ε ε ε , ,  
is the vector of reduced form residuals for net tax, government spending and GDP 
respectively.  The reduced form residuals are unexpected movements in net tax, 
government spending and GDP and are composite errors of the shocks to the economy.  
The reduced form VAR model was estimated using quarterly data for the period 
September 1982 to September 2004.   
                                                                  
2   In the specification of the VAR model used by Blanchard and Perotti to estimate the impact of fiscal policy on United States GDP, 
seasonal dummy variables are interacted with per capita GDP, net tax and government spending to account for seasonal patterns 
in net tax.  This specification made little difference to New Zealand results, therefore a simpler VAR specification is adopted that 
excludes interactive seasonal dummy variables.    
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To gauge the impact of fiscal policy on GDP, restrictions need to be imposed on the 
reduced form errors.  To derive the identification scheme adopted in this paper, write: 
12
TZG T
ttt t aa u u εε =++    (2) 
12
GZT G
ttt t bb u u εε =++    (3) 
12
Z TG Z
ttt t ccu εεε =++    (4) 
where 
T
t u , 
G
t u , and 
Z
t u  are the mutually uncorrelated structural residuals for net tax, 
government spending and GDP.  These structural shocks need to be recovered to identify 
the impact of net tax and government spending on GDP. 
Equation (2) shows that unexpected movements in net tax are a function of unexpected 
movements in GDP and structural shocks to government spending and net tax.  Equation 
(3) states that unexpected movements in government spending are also owing to 
unexpected movements in GDP and structural shocks in net tax and government spending.  
Finally, equation (4) states that unexpected movements in GDP are related to unexpected 
movements in net tax and government spending and structural shocks to GDP.   
The key challenge is to estimate the parameters of equations (2) to (4).  This is done 
using the identification procedures developed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti 
(2004) for the purpose of evaluating the effects of fiscal policy on GDP for the United 
States and a group of OECD economies. 
Contemporaneous changes in net tax and government spending in response to GDP 
movements could potentially occur for two reasons.  First, net tax and government 
spending may automatically change in response to GDP movements under existing fiscal 
policy settings.  Second, the government may discretionarily vary net tax and spending in 
response to movements in GDP by changing fiscal policy settings.  However, as noted by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the use of quarterly data virtually eliminates the operation of 
the second channel owing to recognition and implementation lags with regards to 
discretionary fiscal policy.  Therefore,  1 a  and  1 b  can be obtained from independent 
estimates of elasticities of net tax and government spending to output. 
Girouard and André (2005) provide estimates of output elasticities for direct taxes on 
individuals, corporate income taxes, and indirect taxes for a number of OECD countries.  
They estimated New Zealand tax to output elasticities using annual data for the period 
1989 to 2003.  Based on these estimates  1 a  is set equal to one.  This means that a one 
percentage point increase in GDP leads to a one percentage point increase in taxes.  
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) it is assumed that government 
spending does not automatically respond to unexpected movements in GDP, therefore  1 b  
is set equal to zero.  
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Estimates for  1 a  and  1 b  provide the basis for estimating the parameters  1 c  and  2 c  of 
equation (4).  Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), cyclically adjusted reduced form net 
tax and government spending residuals are used as instrumental variables to estimate  1 c  
and  2 c .  The cyclically adjusted net tax (
* T
t ε ) and government spending (
* G
t ε ) reduced 




















t b ε ε ε ε = − = 1
*
.  
The cyclically adjusted reduced form residuals 
* T
t ε  and 
* G
t ε  can be used as instruments 
as they are not correlated with the structural GDP shock 
Z
t u . 
Finally, estimates are required for  2 a  and  2 b .  As noted by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
it is difficult to determine the ordering of government net tax and spending decisions.  Do 
governments make a decision to tax first and then spend, or do they spend and then tax?  
In the baseline model net tax is ordered before government spending.  But because there 
is no clear answer to the question, the reverse ordering is considered in the sensitivity 
analysis in section 4.  When net tax is ordered before government spending  0 2 = a  and 
2 b  is estimated.  When government spending is ordered before net tax  0 2 = b  and  2 a  is 
estimated.  As is discussed in Section 4, in practice this issue is of little consequence 
because the dynamic response of GDP to both net tax and government spending shocks 
is basically invariant to the ordering of net tax and government spending.   
2.2 Data 
To estimate the fiscal VAR for New Zealand at least three variables are required: net tax 
(i.e. government tax revenue less transfer payments), government spending (purchases of 
goods and services), and GDP.  GDP is measured by Statistics New  Zealand’s real 
production GDP series.  The net tax variable is the sum of direct and indirect taxes less 
total transfer payments.  Government spending includes both current (consumption) and 
capital (investment) spending.  All data enter the model in real per capita, seasonally 
adjusted terms.  Fiscal data are deflated using the implicit GDP deflator.  The real per 
capita data are plotted in Figure 1. 
Quarterly aggregate data are collated for all variables from June 1982.  All fiscal series cover 
central government with the exception of government investment, which also includes local 
government, because a central government investment series is unavailable.  The purchase 
of frigates in 1997 and 1999 are removed from both the purchases of government goods 
and services and the goods and services tax (GST) series.   
Quarterly fiscal data were constructed using two data sources: Statistics New Zealand 
National Accounts Data and the New  Zealand Crown Accounts (and their supporting 
financial data).  Data on government purchases of goods and services (both current and 
capital) were drawn from the National Account (1993) expenditure GDP series for the 
period June 1987 to date, and were backdated to June 1982 using the National Accounts 
(1968) expenditure GDP series. 
For direct taxes (source deductions and gross companies tax payments), data are 
available on a quarterly basis from June 1982.  These series account for in excess of 73 
percent of annual total tax receipts prior to the introduction of GST in December 1986, and 
in excess of 86 percent thereafter.  Where quarterly data at a disaggregate level are 
unavailable (between June 1982 and June 1987), quarterly data are estimated by  
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allocating the annual figures in the crown financial statements over the quarters based on 
the distribution of receipts in the later period (post June 1987).  Total tax receipts and the 
sum of direct and indirect tax have been reconciled back to the crown financial statements 
from 1983/84 to 1990/91.  In 1991/92 the crown accounts moved from a cash basis to 
accruals basis.  Due to GST and source deductions being on a cash basis, our cash 
receipts figures no longer reconcile back to the Crown Financial Statements.  However, 
the variance between the calculated total tax receipts and the crown financial statements 
is small, with the average error being around 1.4 percent.  Prior to 1994 transfer payments 
data are available on a less frequent basis.  Based on the known relative quarterly 
allocations, the quarterly transfer payments data can be constructed.
3
 
Figure 1 – Variables used in the estimation of the fiscal VAR 




































































































































































































































































                                                                  
3   The variance in the quarterly government transfer series is small (observed from the later period), with the total average quarterly 
transfer ranging from 24.5 percent to 25.5 percent of the total annual transfers.  
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2.3  Time series properties of the data and trend 
specification 
Figure 1 shows that per capita real GDP, net tax and government spending have grown 
over time.  To account for the upward trend in the data structural VAR models are often 
specified to identify shocks that move variables temporarily away from their long-run 
paths.  Structural VARs in this tradition include Sims (1980), Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
and Dungey and Pagan (2000).  This modelling approach is also adopted by Buckle, Kim, 
Kirkham, McLellan and Sharma (2002) for their structural VAR model of the New Zealand 
economy.  It is also the modelling approach followed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 
in this paper. 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) adopt two trend specifications for their United States fiscal 
VAR: one allowing for deterministic time trends in the data and the other allowing for 
stochastic trends.  The deterministic specification includes time and time squared as 
additional regressors on the logarithms of per capita net tax, government spending and 
GDP.  The assumption here is that variables grow along long-run equilibrium paths that 
are a function of time.  The stochastic specification is estimated using the first differences 
of the logarithms of net tax, government spending, and GDP less a changing mean that is 
calculated as the geometric average of past first differences with a decay parameter set 
equal to 0.025 per quarter.
4
  The stochastic specification allows for persistent shocks to 
variables’ long-run equilibrium paths.  Variables that exhibit persistent shocks (upward or 
downward movements) are said to be non-stationary. 
One way to assess the appropriateness of the deterministic versus stochastic trend 
specification is to test whether time series are stationary.  A test of stationarity is the unit 
root test.  Appendix A reports the results for the augmented Dickey and Fuller (Said and 
Dickey, 1984) unit root test.  The results provide evidence that the level of per capita net 
tax, government spending, and GDP are non-stationary, suggesting the stochastic 
specification may be more appropriate.  Therefore, in the sensitivity analysis in section 4 
two alternative stochastic trend specifications are considered.  First, net tax, government 
spending and GDP are first differenced.  Second, the data are detrended by removing 
time varying stochastic trends using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter.  The second 
alternative specification is consistent with previous work that examines the impact of 
international and domestic shocks on the New Zealand economy using structural VAR 
methodology (Buckle et al, 2002 and Buckle, Kim and McLellan, 2003). 
3  Effects of fiscal policy 
This section replicates Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) deterministic and stochastic trend 
models using New Zealand data.  It first examines the instantaneous (contemporaneous) 
effects of government spending and net tax shocks and then assesses the dynamic 
effects using impulse response analysis. 
                                                                  
4   Blanchard and Perotti (2002) note that varying the decay parameter used to calculate the geometric average does not change their 
results for the United States.  
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3.1 Contemporaneous  effects 
Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients of the relationships between shocks shown in 
equations (2) to (4) for both the deterministic and stochastic specifications.  Although the 
parameters  2 a ,  2 b ,  1 c  and  2 c  are elasticities, to aid interpretation, the point estimates in 
Table 1 have been transformed to derivatives evaluated at their means and, therefore, 
can be interpreted as the constant dollar change in one variable per constant dollar in 
another. 
Table 1 – Estimated contemporaneous coefficients 
 
2 a   2 b   1 c   2 c  
 Deterministic  specification 
Coefficient  -0.16 -0.06 -0.25 0.14 
t-statistic  -0.88 -0.87 -2.23 0.76 
 Stochastic  specification 
Coefficient  -0.12 -0.05 -0.25 0.13 
t-statistic    -0.68 -0.68 -2.27 0.70 
The direction of the contemporaneous impact of GDP from both the net tax and 
government spending shocks are consistent with the predictions of a simple neo-
Keynesian model, with limited price flexibility in the short-run.  Both the deterministic and 
stochastic specifications show that the contemporaneous effect of a net tax shock on GDP 
( 1 c ) is negative, while the contemporaneous effect of a government spending shock on 
GDP ( 2 c ) is positive.  These estimates also suggest the initial absolute impact of an 
increase in net tax on GDP is larger than an equivalent increase in government spending.   
For the deterministic specification, a one dollar increase in net tax immediately reduces 
GDP by 0.25 dollars.  For the stochastic specification, the immediate impact is equal -- 
with a one dollar increase in net tax also reducing GDP by 0.25 dollars in the first quarter. 
For a government spending shock, the contemporaneous impact on GDP is also almost 
the same for the deterministic specification and the stochastic specification.  The estimate 
for  2 c  under the deterministic specification shows an increase in government spending by 
one dollar results in an immediate increase in GDP of 0.14 dollars.  For the stochastic 
specification, the increase in GDP is 0.13 dollars.  Note that point estimates for  1 c  are 
statistically significant from zero at the 5 percent significance level.  This is not the case 
for  2 c .   
Table 1 also suggests the issue of whether net tax or government spending are ordered 
first is inconsequential.  Because the correlation between cyclically adjusted net tax and 
government spending shocks is low, the point estimates for  2 a  (i.e. when net tax are 
ordered first) and  2 b  (i.e. when government spending is ordered first) are close to zero.  
This result is confirmed in the sensitivity analysis in section 4.  
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3.2 Dynamic  effects 
Next, the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks are assessed using impulse response functions, 
which trace out the response over time of variables to an exogenous shock.  Here, the 
responses of net tax, government spending and GDP to both a discretionary net tax shock 
and a discretionary government spending shock are considered. 
In the deterministic model, variables grow along a long-run equilibrium path and only 
temporarily deviate from this set path.  Impulse responses, which capture these transitory 
deviations from steady state, therefore eventually converge back to zero.  For example, a 
government spending shock may cause GDP to temporarily move away from its long-run 
growth path, but eventually GDP returns to the level implied by its long-run growth path.  
Therefore, if the model is stationary, while shocks may have long-lasting effects they are 
not permanent. 
In the case of the stochastic specification, the interpretation of the impulse responses is 
somewhat different.  Because the endogenous variables are believed to be non-
stationary, and are therefore transformed and modelled as first differences less a moving 
average of past first differences, in contrast to the deterministic specification, fiscal shocks 
have a permanent impact on the level of these variables.  This means that the impulse 
responses do not converge back to zero following a fiscal shock.  For example, a 
government spending shock causes GDP to converge to a new, higher or lower, level.
5
   
Figures 2 and 3 show the responses of net tax, government spending and GDP to two fiscal 
shocks.  The first shock is to net tax (Figure 2) and the second shock is to government 
spending (Figure 3).  Both shocks are temporary; that is, net tax and government spending 
unexpectedly increase by one dollar for one quarter.  All impulses are normalised to show 
the constant dollar shock of the response variables to the respective fiscal shock.  Sixty-
eight percent symmetric confidence bands, which were computed using 1000 bootstrap 
simulations, are shown by dotted lines in Figures 2 and 3.
6
 
For the deterministic specification, Figure 2 shows the immediate response of a one dollar 
increase in net tax is to decrease GDP by 0.24 dollars.  This negative impact on GDP 
persists for a couple of quarters, after which it is partly reversed with GDP increasing 
above trend, before the impact of the net tax shock dissipates.  One possible explanation 
for the increase in GDP, after the decrease in GDP, is that other macroeconomic variables 
(such as interest and exchange rates) adjust in response to the initial fall in GDP, 
eventually stimulating the increase in GDP after the first year.  To confirm this explanation 
it would be necessary to include these additional variables within the fiscal VAR model.
7
  
The response of government spending to the net tax shock is minimal. 
                                                                  
5   To aid comparison of the deterministic and stochastic specifications of the fiscal VAR, the impulse response show the constant 
dollar responses for a fiscal policy shock.  For the stochastic specification, where the endogenous variables are modelled as first 
differences less a moving average of first differences, this requires the impulses to be accumulated to make them comparable with 
the deterministic specification. 
6   For each simulation, random draws (with replacement) are taken from the series of estimated residuals and used to form synthetic 
data for each endogenous variable.   The VAR model is then re-estimated and impulse response functions are computed.  When 
the 1000 simulations are completed, the standard deviation of the impulse response is calculated at each time horizon.   
7   The inclusion of additional variables is left for future work.  
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Figure 2 – Responses to a net tax shock  
Deterministic  specification    Stochastic  specification 
 
For the stochastic specification, Figure 2 shows that in response to a one dollar increase 
in net tax, GDP falls by almost the same magnitude as in the deterministic specification.  
This negative impact on GDP persists for a couple of quarters, after which it is temporarily 
reversed with GDP increasing above trend, before converging to a lower long-run level.  
Like the corresponding deterministic specification, the response in government spending 
from the net tax shock is small.  The permanent impact on net tax of the initial shock is to 
increase net tax by around 0.55 dollars per quarter.  
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Figure 3 – Responses to a government spending shock  
Deterministic  specification    Stochastic  specification 
 
For the deterministic specification, a one dollar increase in government spending leads to 
an immediate 0.14 dollar increase in GDP (see Figure 3).  This positive effect persists for 
around one year, before the impact of the government spending shock on GDP becomes 
negative.  Net tax also increases in response to the government spending shock.  Note, 
however, that while net tax immediately increases by around 0.03 dollars, the peak 
response occurs after about a year and a half.  This most likely reflects lags in the 
collection of tax revenue and the lagged impact of changes in GDP on the labour market 
(and hence transfer payments like unemployment benefits).  The initial increase in 
government spending persists for over two years, although the stimulus reduces from the 
initial one dollar increase in the first quarter to around 0.36 dollars by the second quarter.   
For the stochastic specification, the initial one dollar shock to government spending has a 
permanent positive impact on itself, net tax and GDP.  The immediate one dollar increase 
in government spending diminishes over the first year, eventually resulting in a permanent 
0.67 dollar increase in government spending per quarter.  The peak response in output   
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occurs during the first year, eventually leading to a permanent increase in GDP of around 
0.26 dollars.  Net tax permanently increases by around 0.04 dollars. 
Results reported in this section show that for both the deterministic and stochastic 
specifications an increase in government spending leads to an increase in GDP.  In the 
case of the deterministic specification, the positive stimulus to GDP lasts just over one 
year.  For the stochastic specification, the government shock results in a permanent 
increase in the level of GDP. 
To assess the individual effects of tax revenue and transfer payments we re-estimate the 
stochastic model by splitting net tax into tax revenue and transfer payments.  The fiscal 
VAR now includes four variables; GDP, government spending, tax revenue and transfer 
payments.  Government spending shocks were identified as outlined in Section 2.1.   
Transfer payments were cyclically adjusted using an elasticity of -0.3.  Total tax revenue 
were cyclically adjusted using an elasticity of 1. The fiscal variables were ordered as 
follows: total tax revenue, transfer payments, and finally government spending.     
Sensitivity analyses suggested impulse responses were fairly insensitive to the ordering of 
government spending, transfer payments and total tax revenue.   
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of GDP, government spending, tax revenue and 
transfer payments to a government spending, tax revenue and transfer payments shock, 
respectively.  The results show that following a tax revenue shock, GDP declines and 
remains at a lower level.  But the decline is small.  In contrast, following a rise in transfer 
payments GDP initially rises and then falls.  Moreover, GDP falls by more following the 
rise in transfer payments than it falls following the increase in tax revenue. 
The finding of a negative effect of tax revenue on output is in line with recent international 
literature that finds distortionary taxes have a negative long-run impact on economic 
growth (e.g. Widmalm, 2001, Padovano and Galli, 2002, and Li and Sarte, 2004).  The 
result of a negative effect on output of an increase in transfer payments, on the other 
hand, is supportive of the empirical finding that transfer payments are unproductive 
government spending (e.g. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999, and Bleaney, Gemmell 
and Kneller, 2001).  Increased transfer payments may reduce economic growth because 
of adverse labour supply incentives, for example.  
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Figure 4 – Four variable VAR for the stochastic specification 
                                            Total Taxes Shock                           Transfer Payment Shock                   Government Spending Shock 
TOTAL TAXES RESPONSE TO A TOTAL TAXES SHOCK









TRANSFER RESPONSE TO A TRANSFER SHOCK









SPENDING RESPONSE TO A  SPENDING SHOCK









TRANSFER RESPONSE TO A TOTAL TAXES SHOCK









TOTAL TAXES RESPONSE TO A TRANSFER SHOCK









TOTAL TAXES RESPONSE TO A SPENDING SHOCK









SPENDING RESPONSE TO A TOTAL TAXES SHOCK









SPENDING RESPONSE TO A TRANSFER SHOCK









TRANSFER RESPONSE TO A SPENDING SHOCK









GDP RESPONSE TO A TOTAL TAXES SHOCK









GDP RESPONSE TO A TRANSFER SHOCK









GDP RESPONSE TO A  SPENDING SHOCK









WP 06/08   AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF FISCAL POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND  13
 
4 Sensitivity  analysis 
This section reports some sensitivity analysis of the baseline three variable fiscal VAR.  
To test the robustness of the results, we estimate two alternative fiscal VAR models.  We 
then provide diagnostic tests and consider alternative ordering of variables and elasticities 
for the baseline model.  We also compare the New Zealand results to that from other 
models and economies. 
4.1 Alternative  specifications 
Unit root tests discussed in section 2 suggest that net tax, government spending, and 
GDP are non-stationary and that the stochastic specification may be more appropriate 
than the deterministic model.  This section considers two alternative stochastic trend 
specifications.  First, net tax, government spending and GDP are included in first 
differences.  Second, the data are detrended by removing time varying stochastic trends 
using the Hodrik-Prescott filter. 
The parameter estimates of the contemporaneous relationships shown in equations (2) to 
(4) for the first difference and Hodrick-Prescott trend specification of the fiscal VAR are 
reported in Table 2.  As with the baseline deterministic and stochastic specifications, the 
tax to output elasticity ( 1 a ) is set equal to one and the government spending to output 
elasticity ( 1 b ) is set equal to zero. 
Table 2 – Estimated contemporaneous coefficients: alternative model specifications 
 
2 a   2 b   1 c   2 c  
  First Difference specification 
Coefficient  -0.12 -0.04 -0.26 0.14 
t-statistic  -0.64 -0.64 -2.27 0.78 
  Hodrick-Prescott specification  
Coefficient  -0.06 -0.02 -0.21 0.03 
t-statistic  -0.32 -0.32 -1.89 0.16 
A comparison of the estimated contemporaneous coefficients from the baseline 
deterministic and stochastic models (Table 1) with the estimates from the two alternative 
specifications (Table 2) shows broadly similar results.  The contemporaneous effect of a 
net tax shock on GDP ( 1 c ) is negative, while the contemporaneous effect of a government 
spending shock on GDP ( 2 c ) is positive.  The coefficient estimates for the first difference 
model are almost identical to the estimates from the baseline stochastic model.  For the 
Hodrick-Prescott specification, the estimate for  1 c  is slightly smaller than for the first 
difference, deterministic and stochastic specifications and the estimate for  2 c  is smaller 
than for the other models.  
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Figure 5 – Responses to a net tax and government spending shock: first difference 
model 
Net tax shock  Government spending shock 
 
The impulse responses of net tax, government spending and GDP to a one dollar net tax 
and government spending shock are plotted in Figure 5 for the first difference model and in 
Figure 6 for the Hodrick-Prescott specification.  Figure 5 shows that the impulse responses 
of the first difference and baseline stochastic trend model are virtually identical. 
For the Hodrick-Prescott specification, Figure 6 shows that the fiscal shocks lead to 
temporary deviations of variables from their long-run time varying trend (as measured by 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter) but eventually the impulse responses converge back to zero, 
as is the case for the deterministic model.  For the Hodrick-Prescott specification, the 
reduction in GDP caused by the net tax shock persists for around two quarters, before the 
economy experiences a period where GDP is above trend.  As suggested earlier, this 
period where GDP increases above its long-run path could be owing to the influence of 
other macroeconomic variables (such as interest and exchange rates) that change in 
response to the initial net tax shock.  The decline in GDP may also cause the small 
decrease in government spending.  Following the net tax shock, government spending 
initially declines (as in the case of the deterministic, stochastic and first difference 
specifications).  This result is further discussed in section 4.3.  
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Figure 6 – Responses to a net tax and government spending shock: Hodrick-
Prescott specification 
Net tax shock  Government spending shock 
 
One noticeable difference is that the government spending shock is less persistent for the 
Hodrick-Prescott specification than the deterministic model.  The one dollar government 
spending shock dissipates over the first year.  The positive effect on GDP from the 
government spending shock lasts for less than one year, before the economy experiences 
a period where GDP falls below its trend path.  The impact of the government spending 
shock on net tax is broadly similar to the deterministic specification. 
4.2 Diagnostic  tests 
To assess the stability of parameter estimates, Hansen’s (1992) stability test can be used.  
A key advantage of this test is that it does not require selecting potential structural break 
points.  Moreover, no special treatment of lagged dependent variables is required 
(Hansen, 1992).  However, the test requires variables to be stationary. 
The Hansen stability test produces two types of statistic: a joint test statistic and individual 
test statistics.  Individual test statistics represent the stability of each parameter in the 
reduced-form equations in (1), while the joint test assesses the stability of all the parameters 
jointly in each of the equations in (1).  The null hypothesis of stable estimates is rejected if  
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the individual or joint test statistics are significant, i.e. the p-values are low.  The results for 
the baseline and alternative models, which are reported in Appendix B, show that, overall, 
the parameter estimates are fairly stable for both the individual and joint tests.  Although 
some parameters are unstable individually, they appear to be stable jointly over time. 
To test for model stability we verify the stationary condition of the fiscal VAR models.  This 
formally tests that the impulse responses converge following a fiscal shock.  We compute 
the value of root from the eigenvalues of the companion matrix derived from the 
parameter estimates.  A value of root of greater than one indicates that a model is 
systematically unstable.  The results, also reported in Appendix B, show that the baseline 
and alternative models are stationary.  The values of roots are less than one although 
they are larger for the deterministic and Hodrick-Prescott models compared to the 
stochastic trend and first difference models. 
To detect possible misspecification of the models we test that the residuals from the 
reduced-form equations in (1) are normally distributed using Jarque and Bera’s (1987) test 
of normality.  The results, reported in Appendix C, show that the equations have normally 
distributed errors except for the government expenditure equation in the deterministic and 
the Hodrick-Prescott model. 
We also use Ramsey’s (1969) RESET test of specification error to determine possible 
misspecification of the models.  The RESET test allows assessing the linearity 
assumption in the reduced-form equations in (1).  The results, also reported in Appendix 
C, show that the hypothesis of model misspecification is rejected for all equations except 
for the deterministic model.  This finding and the results from the normality tests strongly 
suggest that the deterministic model does not fit the New Zealand data well.  The finding 
is in line with the unit root tests, which suggest that a model specification that assumes 
non-stationary variables is more appropriate for New Zealand. 
4.3  Alternative ordering of variables and elasticities 
In the baseline model, net tax is ordered before government spending.  To assess the 
sensitivity of the impulse responses the ordering is reversed and government spending is 
placed before net tax.  The results, which are plotted in Appendix D, show that the impulse 
responses from the alternative ordering are similar.  For the stochastic and first difference 
models, there is only a minor difference that the immediate response of each fiscal variable 
from the shock to the other fiscal variable is somewhat larger when net tax are ordered first. 
For the Hodrick-Prescott specification, there are small differences in the immediate 
response of net tax to a government spending shock, and the immediate response of 
government spending to a net tax shock.  With the alternative ordering, where government 
spending is placed before net tax, government spending no longer declines following a net 
tax shock.  Moreover, with the alternative ordering net tax immediately declines in 
response to an increase in government spending.  The opposite occurs with the baseline 
Hodrick-Prescott specification. 
To test the sensitivity of the fiscal VAR to the tax-output elasticity, two alternative 
elasticities of 0.5 and 1.5 are used instead of 1.  The tax-output elasticity is a key variable 
in forming the cyclically adjusted net tax residuals that are used as instrumental variables 
to estimate the contemporaneous effect of a change in net tax on output.  The impulse 
responses with the alternative elasticities are plotted in Appendix E for the stochastic, first 
difference and Hodrick-Prescott models.  The results show that the impact of increasing 
the tax-output elasticity from 1 to 1.5 is to marginally increase the impact that a net tax  
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shock has on output for all three models.  The result of decreasing the tax-output elasticity 
from 1 to 0.5 is to reduce the negative impact on GDP over the short term of the net tax 
shock.  Overall, despite substantial changes in the tax-output elasticity, the responses of 
GDP to the net tax shock are similar. 
4.4  Comparison with other models and economies 
Finally, we compare the New Zealand results to that from other models and economies.  
Table 3 summarises the fiscal multipliers estimated from the New Zealand VAR and prior 
work by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and Perotti (2004).  Contemporaneous, peak and 
long term responses are reported.
8
 
While there is considerable variation between economies in the contemporaneous 
responses of GDP to fiscal shocks, they are generally positive for government spending 
and negative for a net tax shock.  However, in absolute terms the impact of a government 
spending shock on GDP tends to be larger than a net tax shock.  The peak and long-term 
responses of GDP to government spending shocks differ substantially across economies, 
being positive in some countries and negative in others.  Results for the United States 
suggest that the peak and long-term government spending multipliers are sensitive to the 
time period and whether or not inflation and the 10 year nominal interest rate are included 
in the VAR model.  The peak and long-term tax multipliers are generally negative, 
although again there is considerably variation across economies.   
Note that for Australia and New Zealand, which are both small open economies, the fiscal 
multipliers are relatively small compared with the larger economies, possibly reflecting the 
role that imports, private savings, interest and exchange rates play in influencing the way 
these economies adjust to fiscal shocks.   
Table 3 – GDP response to a government spending and net tax shock 
Study  Country  Sample  Trend Spending response of GDP  Net tax response of GDP 
       Impact Peak**  Long-term* Impact  Peak**  Long-term*
United States  1960-1997  DT  0.84  1.29 (15) 0.97  -0.69  -0.78 (5)  -0.22  Blanchard and 
Perottri (2002)    1960-1997  ST  0.90  0.90 (1) 0.66  -0.70  -1.33 (7)  -1.29 
Re-estimated    1974-1997  DT 2.39 2.47  (2)  0.30  -1.04 -1.04  (1)  -0.06 
    1974-1997  ST  1.23  1.23 (1)  0.44  -0.80  -1.11 (8)  -1.04 
                 
Perotti (2004)***  United States  1980-2000  DT  0.60  -0.60 (1) -0.10  -0.25  -0.90 (8)  -0.15 
  Germany  1980-2000  DT  0.60  -1.70 (1) -0.20  -0.20  -0.50 (13)  0.25 
 United 
Kingdom 
1980-2000  DT  -0.05  -0.50 (4) -0.45  -0.05  -0.35 (7)  0.05 
  Canada  1980-2000  DT  0.05  -1.70 (1) -0.80  0.10  0.80 (6)  0.30 
  Australia  1980-2000  DT 0.30  0.40  (14) 0.20  -0.30 -0.50  (6)  -0.05 
                 
New Zealand  1982-2004  DT  0.13  0.37 (3) 0.00  -0.24  -0.24 (1)  0.00 
  1982-2004  ST  0.12  0.44 (3) 0.26  -0.25  -0.25 (1)  -0.06 
Claus, Gill, Lee 
and McLellan 
(2006) 
  1982-2004  FD 0.13 0.47  (3) 0.31  -0.25 -0.25  (1)  -0.06 
    1982-2004  HP  0.03  -0.26 (5) 0.00  -0.20  0.22 (3)  0.00 
*  Long-term is taken to be after 20 quarters. 
**  Peak is the largest absolute deviation from zero. 
***  Model includes 5 variables: government spending, net tax, output, inflation and a nominal interest rate.  
DT, ST, FD and HP indicate at a deterministic trend, stochastic trend, first difference and a Hodrick-Prescott trend.  
                                                                  
8   Although Perotti’s (2004) estimates of the fiscal response are over a similar time period as for New Zealand the model 
specification is different as it includes inflation and a 10-year nominal interest rate. For this reason we re-estimate the fiscal 
response for Blanchard and Perotti (2002)  
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The contemporaneous response of GDP to fiscal shocks displayed in Table 3 does not 
capture the dynamic response of GDP to these shocks.  Therefore, to compare the 
dynamic response of GDP to fiscal shocks across the various VAR models, Table 4 
reports the cumulative response of GDP after four and twelve quarters.  Consistent with 
prior work, the twelve quarter cumulated response is referred to as the long-run multiplier.  
Table 4 shows that government spending tends to also have a positive effect on GDP in 
the medium and long run.  However, the immediate negative effect on GDP of a net tax 
shock does not persist for all countries in the long run.  Net tax increases because of an 
increase in tax revenue and/or a decline in transfer payments.  A positive response of 
GDP to a discretionary net tax shock may therefore be the result of a decline in transfer 
payments having a positive effect on GDP that more than offsets any negative effects of 
increased taxation.  Alternatively, an increase in net tax may be the result of tax policy 
reform that has raised tax revenue but at the same time has reduced the distortionary 
effects of taxation, for example, by broadening the tax base. 
In summary, the results from the sensitivity analysis and robustness testing suggest that 
the fiscal VAR with a specification that assumes non-stationary variables is well specified 
and appropriate for New  Zealand.  Moreover, the estimated effects of fiscal policy on 
output fall within the range of international evidence.  In fact, our results suggest that the 
New Zealand data may actually fit the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) model better than the 
US data.  Performing the same sensitivity analysis and robustness testing for the US 
model as for the New Zealand fiscal VAR, we found evidence of parameter and model 
instability and potential model misspecification for the US model.  For example, the 
equations for the US model have non-normally distributed errors, especially for the net tax 
equation.  In addition, we found that the US equations with temporary tax cut dummy 
variables have unstable estimates for the joint test although the equations become stable 
once the dummy variables are removed from the equations.
9
 
Table 4 – Cumulative GDP response to a spending/tax shock 
Study  Country  Sample  Trend Cumulative response of 
GDP to a Spending shock
  Cumulative response of 
GDP to a Net tax shock 
        4 12    4 12 
United States  1960-1997  DT  2.13  6.63    -2.89  -8.18  Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002)    1960-1997  ST  2.09  5.12    -3.60  -14.45 
Re-estimated   1974-1997  DT  9.70  20.07   -3.53  -8.48 
  1974-1997  ST  3.66  7.34    -2.99  -11.54 
               
Perotti (2004)*  United States  1980-2000  DT  -0.25  -1.02    0.43  2.11 
 Germany  1980-2000  DT  0.34  -0.09    -0.02  0.29 
 United  Kingdom  1980-2000  DT  0.44  -3.47    0.23  0.91 
 Canada  1980-2000  DT  -0.22  -0.17    -0.30  -1.81 
 Australia  1980-2000  DT  0.12  0.41    0.36  1.16 
               
New Zealand  1982-2004  DT  0.80  -0.09    -0.15  -0.25 
 1982-2004  ST  1.04  3.13    -0.35  -0.82 
Claus, Gill, Lee 
and McLellan 
(2006)   1982-2004  FD  1.16  3.68    -0.35  -0.82 
  1982-2004  HP  0.00  -0.92    0.20  0.55 
*  Model includes 5 variables: government spending, net tax, output, inflation and a nominal interest rate.  
DT, ST, FD and HP indicate at a deterministic trend, stochastic trend, first difference and a Hodrick-Prescott trend.  
                                                                  
9   The results are not reported but available upon request.  
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5  Contributions of fiscal policy to 
New Zealand business cycles 
In section 3 we investigated the dynamic response of output to net tax and government 
spending shocks via impulse response analysis.  In this section, we use the three variable 
fiscal VAR to measure the historical contribution of fiscal policy to New Zealand business 
cycles.  The aim is to assess the extent to which fiscal policy has added to or subtracted 
from GDP growth or percentage deviations in GDP from trend.  The section also 
compares the fiscal VAR measures of fiscal impulse with another indicator of fiscal 
impulse developed by Philip and Janssen (2002). 
5.1  Fiscal policy and New Zealand business cycles 
We use the first difference and Hodrick-Prescott specifications, two specifications that are 
commonly used, to represent business cycles.  The Hodrick-Prescott specification 
measures deviations in GDP from its trend growth path, the output gap.  Historical 
decompositions thus assess the contributions from discretionary net tax and government 
spending shocks to the output gap.  The first difference specification, also known as the 
growth cycle, measures the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on GDP growth, which is 
approximated by logarithmic first differences of GDP. 
Historical decompositions are derived from the structural shocks and impulse responses 
as follows: 










== ∑∑ Z G T j , , =  (5) 
In equation (5)  t Z  measures the output gap or GDP growth rate at time t, 
j
i θ  is the 
th i  
impulse response associated with the 
th j  structural shock, where the structural shocks 
correspond to discretionary net tax, government spending and output shocks. 
Figure 6 shows the contribution to New  Zealand business cycles from net tax and 
government spending, and the combination of both for the period 1983 to 2005.  Results 
are presented for both the first difference and Hodrick-Prescott specifications.  Figure 6 
shows that the business cycles for each specification are somewhat different.  The 
volatility of the growth rate tends to be larger than for the Hodrick-Prescott specification.  
The zero line in each chart represents the point where each respective shock is making 
no contribution to the business cycles.  Therefore, when the grey bars are positive, this 




For the first difference specification, which have been presented as the contribution to 
annual GDP growth to aid interpretation, shows the contribution from net tax to GDP 
growth is relatively small compared to the contribution of discretionary government 
spending.  Over the period 1983 to 2005 it is difficult to determine whether discretionary 
changes in government spending were pro- or counter-cyclical.  During the recession in 
the early 1990s the combined contribution of net tax and government spending (i.e. the 
                                                                  
10   At the beginning of the sample period initial conditions may make a substantial contribution to detrended output.  However, over 
time the contribution from initial conditions will converge towards zero.  Therefore, the focus of the analysis in from the late 1980s 
onwards.    
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total contribution from discretionary fiscal policy) was to generally exacerbate the 
recession, albeit that the impact was somewhat small.  Discretionary fiscal policy tended 
to add to output growth during the mid- to late-1990s, when New Zealand had relative 
high growth rates, but again the size of the impact was small.  During the past five years, 
the contribution from discretionary fiscal policy has tended to accentuate movements in 
output, i.e. fiscal policy has been procyclical. 
Figure 6 – Contribution of fiscal policy to New Zealand business cycles 
First Difference specification    Hodrick-Prescott specification 
 
Note: The series represented by bars on Figure 6 are contributions from net tax, government spending and fiscal 
impulse.  The series represented by lines are deviations in GDP from the Hodrick-Prescott trend and annual GDP 
growth. 
Turning to the Hodrick-Prescott specification, net tax appears to play a greater role, 
compared with the first difference specification.  Furthermore, over the entire period 1982 
to 2005, the contribution from net tax is generally pro-cyclical; more so than the pro-
cyclicality between the contribution from discretionary government spending and the 
output gap.  Looking at the total contribution from discretionary fiscal policy, during the 
1991 to 1992 recession, discretionary fiscal policy accentuated the negative output gap 
according to the Hodrick-Prescott trend specification.  As the economy recovered and the  
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output gap became positive, discretionary fiscal policy made a positive contribution to the 
output gap.  Discretionary fiscal policy contributed little to deviations in output from trend 
during the 1998 recession, and since then has tended to have a pro-cyclical effect. 
5.2  Comparison with Treasury’s measure of fiscal impulse 
This section compares a measure of fiscal impulse, developed by Philip and Janssen 
(2002), with those produced by various specifications of the fiscal VAR.  We start by 
noting the conceptual similarities and differences between the alternative measures of 
fiscal impulse and then compare quantitative estimates.   
The Philip and Janssen indicator of fiscal impulse is defined as the change in the estimated 
structural primary cash balance.  The structural primary cash balance is constructed by 
taking cyclically-adjusted tax receipts and subtracting cyclically-adjusted government 
spending (which includes some capital items that are deemed to have an impact on 
aggregate demand) and net interest payments.  At a general level (and ignoring net interest 
payments) this measure of fiscal impulse (
1
t FI ) can be denoted as follows: 
1** **
11 () ttt t t FI T T G G −− =− − −    (6) 
where the superscript 
* indicates the variable has been cyclically adjusted.  This indicator 
of fiscal impulse is seen as measuring whether changes in fiscal policy are adding to, or 
subtracting from, aggregate demand pressure in the economy (although it is not always 
specified how aggregate demand is being measured) and is usually estimated using 
annual data.   
This type of measure of fiscal impulse has two widely cited limitations.  First, the 
composition of fiscal policy changes are not taken into account, so for example tax 
decreases and government spending increases are treated symmetrically in terms of their 
impact on aggregate demand.  Second, at best, this type of indicator only captures the 
first round impacts of changes in fiscal policy, and not additional dynamic effects.   
Interpreting measures of fiscal impulse from VAR models depends on the trend 
specification adopted.  To see this, first denote fiscal impulse (
2 FI ) from the Hodrick-
Prescott fiscal VAR specifications as follows: 
2* * ()
MM
tt t t t FI T T G G =− − −   (7) 
where the superscript M  indicates model-adjusted government spending and net tax 
(adjusted to isolate the discretionary components of fiscal policy) and the superscript 
* 
indicates the time or Hodrick-Prescott trend in net tax and government spending.  In this 
specification fiscal impulse arises from discretionary changes in fiscal policy in which net 
tax and government spending deviate from their long-run growth paths (as measured by 
their Hodrick-Prescott trends) and is estimated using quarterly data. 
The measure of fiscal impulse (
3
t FI ) that emerges from the first difference specification of 
the fiscal VAR can be denoted as follows: 








t t G G T T FI − − − − − =    (8)  
WP 06/08   AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF FISCAL POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND  22
 
In this specification fiscal impulse arises because of changes in taxes and government 
spending.  This measure of fiscal impulse gauges the contribution of fiscal policy to GDP 
growth.   
The VAR measures of fiscal impulse overcome the two main limitations of indicator type 
measures of fiscal impulse.  First, the VAR measures of fiscal impulse account for 
changes in the composition of fiscal policy.  This is because they feed through a system of 
equations that allows for different impacts of tax and spending changes on GDP.  Second, 
because dynamic interactions are specifically modelled within the VAR model, second 
round effects are captured.   
Figure 7 – Alternative measures of fiscal impulse 

















































































Philip & Janssen VAR GDP growth  
Figure 7 shows the two measures of fiscal impulse from the first difference and Hodrick-
Prescott specifications of the fiscal VAR and compares them with the Philip and Janssen 
indicator measure of fiscal impulse.  The first chart of Figure 7 corresponds to the first 
difference fiscal VAR specification and shows the contribution of fiscal impulse to annual 
GDP growth.  The second chart of Figure 7 corresponds to the Hodrick-Prescott fiscal 
VAR specification and shows the contribution of fiscal impulse to deviations in GDP from 
trend (that is, the output gap).  The Philip and Janssen measure of fiscal impulse has 
been inverted, compared to the way it is usually presented, to aid comparison with the  
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fiscal VAR measures of fiscal impulse.  Because initial conditions can make substantial 
contributions to GDP growth or deviations in GDP from trend this analysis focuses from 
the mid-1980s onwards.   
Figure 7 suggests that in general the sign and magnitude of the first difference fiscal VAR 
specification and the Philip and Janssen measures of fiscal impulse are similar, although 
there are periods where there are differences.  It is interesting to note that Treasury’s 
current measure of fiscal impulse tends to display larger absolute changes than the 
measure of fiscal impulse from the first difference fiscal VAR model.   
In the late 1980s both measures of fiscal impulse suggest that fiscal policy was acting to 
dampen GDP growth; this was more so for the Philip and Janssen measure of fiscal 
impulse.  During the 1991 and 1992 recession, the measure of fiscal impulse from the first 
difference fiscal VAR suggests that fiscal policy made a larger negative contribution during 
this period, than is suggested by the Philip and Janssen measure of fiscal impulse.   
Throughout the remainder of the 1990s both measures are in broad agreement about the 
contribution of fiscal policy to GDP growth (although the stimulus from fiscal policy in 1997 
is considerably larger for the Philip and Janssen measure compared to the VAR measure 
of fiscal impulse).  In the period from 2002, at least until more recently, the two measures 
suggest different impacts of fiscal policy on GDP growth.   
In general, there has also been some degree of congruence between the measure of 
fiscal impulse produced from the Hodrick-Prescott VAR specification and the Philip and 
Janssen measure of fiscal impulse, particularly over the last five years.  However, one 
period where the two measures noticeably differ is in the mid-1990s, when the Philip 
Janssen measure suggests discretionary fiscal policy was subtracting from positive 
deviations in GDP from trend, whereas the fiscal VAR measure suggests fiscal policy was 
adding to positive deviations in GDP from trend.   
6 Conclusions 
This paper has examined the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on New Zealand GDP using a 
structural VAR model.  Following the modelling procedures developed and implemented by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004), the impact of government spending 
(purchases of goods and services), taxes and transfers on GDP was identified by assuming 
that discretionary fiscal policy is unable to respond to GDP shocks within one quarter.   
Institutional information on the tax and transfer system are therefore used to quantify the 
automatic effects of changes in GDP on government spending, taxes and transfers.   
Results showed that an increase in government spending led to an increase in GDP in the 
short term, while an increase in net tax reduced GDP in the short-term.  The size of the 
response in GDP to changes in government spending and net tax was dependent on the 
trend specification adopted.  The estimated impact of increases in government spending 
or net tax on New Zealand GDP was smaller than the estimated effects of changes in 
government spending or net tax on GDP for the United States.  In this respect, results for 
New  Zealand are similar to those for Australia and most likely reflect the small, open 
nature of both economies.  When the fiscal VAR model was estimated with the net tax 
variable separated into taxes and government transfers, impulse responses revealed that 
a tax revenue shock lowered GDP (although the decline was small), while a government 
transfer shock lead to an increase in GDP in the short-term, but a decline in GDP over the 
medium-term.    
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The structural VAR model was also used to analyse the historical contributions of fiscal 
policy to New Zealand business cycles.  Two measures of fiscal impulse were examined: 
one based on a first difference VAR specification and the other based on detrending data 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  The fiscal impulse measure based on the first difference 
specification showed that fiscal policy dampened GDP growth in the early 1990s, while 
adding to growth in the mid-to-late 1990s.  Since 2001 fiscal policy has tended to add to 
GDP growth.  The fiscal impulse measure based on the Hodrick-Prescott trend 
specification showed that fiscal policy subtracted from positive deviations in GDP from 
trend in the early 1990s, but made a positive contribution during the period 1993 to 1998.  
Since 1998 fiscal policy tended to subtract from positive deviations in GDP from trend.  
Although there is a reasonable degree of congruence between the Philip and Janssen 
measure of fiscal impulse and the alternative structural VAR measures (especially for the 
first difference specification), there are periods where the measures differ significantly on 
the contribution of fiscal policy to GDP.   
This paper provides a basis for further work on fiscal policy and the New  Zealand 
economy.  One area of work is to disaggregate government spending and tax data to 
analyse the differential effect of changes in different spending and tax categories on GDP.  
A further area of work is to explicitly incorporate the government budget constraint.   
Another extension of this work is to include fiscal variables in a larger structural VAR 
model of the New Zealand economy (for example, the structural VAR model developed by 
Buckle, Kim, Kirkham, McLellan and Sharma, 2002) to measure the effect of changes in 
fiscal policy on other economic variables, such as inflation, interest and exchange rates, 
and private sector output.  This larger model could also be used to examine the impact of 
exogenous shocks on the fiscal balance and, using techniques developed by Buckle, Kim 
and Tam (2001), the ex-ante fiscal balance required to maintain some specified lower or 
upper bound for the fiscal balance.    
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Appendix A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root 
tests 








None -3.279  -0.629*  0.594  3.300 
Intercept -3.055  -1.262*  -0.683*  0.440* 
Intercept and Trend  -2.754*  -2.183*  -1.315*  -1.564* 
* Indicates statistically significant unit root. 
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Appendix B: Stability tests 
Appendix Table 2 – Stability test results for equations and individual parameters 
Table B-1. Stability Test Results for Equation and Individual Parameter
 
  Deterministic Specification  Stochastic Specification  Hodrick-Prescott Specification  First Difference Specification 
  Tax G.E.  GDP Tax G.E.  GDP Tax G.E.  GDP Tax G.E.  GDP 
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(1.00)  - - - - - - - - - 





(1.00)  - - - - - - - - - 
   
* Indicates statistically significant unstable estimates 
* Tax = Net tax and G.E. = Government Expenditure   
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Appendix Table 3 – Stability test results for the fiscal VAR model 
 
Deterministic Stochastic  Hodrick-Prescott  First  Difference 
0.219 0.273 0.132 0.233 
0.352 0.273 0.365 0.233 
0.444 0.503 0.507 0.483 
0.444 0.503 0.637 0.483 
0.477 0.527 0.637 0.516 
0.477 0.527 0.685 0.516 
0.514 0.534 0.690 0.519 
0.691 0.534 0.690 0.519 
0.691 0.609 0.690 0.610 
0.779 0.609 0.690 0.610 
0.886 0.690 0.718 0.691 
0.886  0.690 0.718 0.691 
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Appendix C: Normality and linearity tests 
Appendix Table 4 – Test results for normality of residuals 
 Net  Tax G.E.  GDP 
 Statistics  P-Value  Statistics  P-Value  Statistics  P-Value 
Deterministic 0.111  0.946  19.387  0.000*  2.001  0.368 
Stochastic  2.377 0.305 3.206 0.201 3.641 0.162 
Hodrick-Prescott 1.651  0.438  19.453 0.000* 3.728  0.155 
First  Difference  1.700 0.427 4.593 0.101 4.763 0.092 
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Appendix Table 5 – Test results for linearity 
 D.T.  S.T.  H.P.  F.D. 
Statistics 0.702  0.185  0.027  0.233  Powers 
= 2  P-Value 0.405  0.669  0.869  0.631 
Statistics 4.176  1.392  0.029*  1.417  Powers 
= 2,3  P-Value 0.020*  0.256  0.972  0.250 
Statistics 2.763  1.122  0.448  1.099 
Net Tax 
Powers 
= 2,4  P-Value 0.049*  0.346  0.720  0.356 
Statistics 0.340  1.898  0.067  3.139  Powers 
= 2  P-Value 0.562  0.173  0.797  0.081* 
Statistics 0.173  1.177  0.046  1.872  Powers 
= 2,3  P-Value 0.841  0.314  0.955  0.162 
Statistics 0.166  0.935  0.030  1.276 
G.E. 
Powers 
= 2,4  P-Value 0.919  0.429  0.993  0.290 
Statistics 105.813  0.385  0.008  1.247  Powers 
= 2  P-Value 0.000*  0.537  0.931  0.268 
Statistics 150.911  0.470  0.057  1.007  Powers 
= 2,3  P-Value 0.000*  0.627  0.945  0.371 
Statistics 99.604  0.558  0.082  0.694 
GDP 
Powers 
= 2,4  P-Value 0.000*  0.644  0.969  0.559 
* Indicates significant non-linearity 
* D.T. = Deterministic, S.T. = Stochastic, H.P. = Hodrick-Prescott and F.D. = First Difference 
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Appendix D: Alternative ordering 
Appendix Figure 1 – Alternative ordering of net tax and government spending for 
the deterministic trend specification 
  Net tax shock               Government spending shock 
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Appendix Figure 2 – Alternative ordering of net tax and government spending for the 
stochastic trend specification 
  Net tax shock               Government spending shock 
 
Note: The figure for the first difference trend specification is not reported, as it is almost identical to 
the one for stochastic trend specification. However, it is available upon request.  
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Appendix Figure 3 – Alternative ordering of net tax and government spending for the 
Hodrick-Prescott specification 
        Net tax shock      Government spending shock 
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Appendix E: Alternative elasticities 
Appendix Figure 4 – Sensitivity tests for the impulse responses to net tax shock 
          Deterministic Trend                            Stochastic Trend                            Hodrick-Prescott                               First Difference                             
NET TAX RESPONSE TO A NET TAX SHOCK









NET TAX RESPONSE TO A NET TAX SHOCK








NET TAX RESPONSE TO A NET TAX SHOCK








NET TAX RESPONSE TO A NET TAX SHOCK









SPENDING RESPONSE TO A NET TAX SHOCK
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Appendix Figure 5 – Sensitivity test for the impulse responses to a government spending shock 
           Deterministic Trend                           Stochastic Trend                             Hodrick-Prescott                               First Difference                             
SPENDING RESPONSE TO A SPENDING SHOCK
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